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The paper explores the quarterly sequence of business cycles in Iceland for 40 years between 1970 
and 2009 using the business cycle technique of Leamer (2009). We apply first a turning point (TP) 
dating identification procedure based on the Hendrick- Prescott (HP) filter of the quarterly growth 
rates of GDP and then we use different candidates for leading indicators for turning points. We find 
that the Iceland economy has a rather short business cycle of about 3 years and most macroeconom-
ic indicators are in accordance with the business cycles. Only a few indicators have a predictive po-
tential, some variables like consumption show a one quarter lag. Furthermore, we apply the concept 
of abnormal contributions to growth for candidates as a leading indicator of turning points. We find 
that over the last decade there is some evidence that abnormal growth contributions are better indi-
cators for troughs than for peaks.  
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1.  Introduction 
The Icelandic economy attracted lots of attention in the last years, since Iceland has been one of the 
first victims of the global financial crisis of 2008. Clearly, the rapid rise of the Iceland economy in the 
last 100 years out from a fishing community and in particular the economic miracle of the last 20 
years has been remarkable. After 3 major banks of Iceland collapsed in fall 2008, the IMF started a 
major financial support program, and main political attention now focuses on the recovery of the 
Iceland economy. The current downturn of the economy since the last peak in 2007 has not ended, 
and many people want to know at what time point the downturn can be stopped. The answer to this 
question is a topic of the economic business cycle (BC) analysis and relates to the question as how 
has the Iceland economy responded to shocks and cycles in the past. Clearly, the current financial 
crisis is unprecedented in many respects – and hopefully remains a unique event for the future- but 2 
 
 
nevertheless the quest for the past and potential solutions for a cure might be found in the a study of 
the BC over the last 20 years. 
A previous analysis of the business cycle was given in Pétursson (2000) based on a Markov switching 
model of yearly GDP data since 1945. Other business cycle dating procedures based on quarterly 
data are not available, so we decided to create an own business cycle dating method, which follows 
the spirit of the BC dating method of the NBER (national bureau of economic research).  
The quarterly data were provided by the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI)
1, which were originally used to 
build a quarterly GMM model (Daníelsson et al. 2009). 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we describe the business cycle dating method. 
Then we turn in section 3 to the exploratory business cycle analysis were we investigate several  ma-
cro-economic variable for their potential to lead and lag turning points. Also, we explore if the cumu-
lated growth accounting method of Leamer (2009) will give more insight into the turning point analy-
sis (TPA). In section 4 we analyze some financial data. In a final section we conclude. 
 
1.1. Definition of a recession 
The definition of a recession according to NBER is: „A recession is a significant decline for more than 
a few month in … real GDP, Real income, Employment, Industrial production, and Wholesale retail 
sales.“  (See www.nber.org/cycles.html ) 
Leamer (2009, p. 111) criticizes the NBER definition to be too much descriptive, because it concen-
trates only on symptoms. Thus he suggests to replace the definition by the following one: „Recession 
is a persistent and substantial increase in unwanted idleness.“  Idleness is measured (in Leamer’s 
analysis for the US) by the unemployment rate (UR), the intensity of work (hours in manufacturing), 
and the excess capacity in manufacturing.  
Furthermore, Leamer (2009, p.111) goes on in classifying the business cycle into 5 phases (or “epsi-
odes”):   
Normal growth, Recessions and Recoveries, Sputters and Spurts. 
Sputters are defined as “declines of indicators that did not lead to a recession” and spurts as “de-
clines of unemployment (UR) during expansions”.  There had been only a few sputters and spurts 
during the last 50 years in the US, most of them were caused by special economic policy acts by pres-
idents, like the Kennedy tax cuts in the 1960ies or the Bush tax cuts in the 1990ies. 
Analyzing the US business cycle, Leamer (2009, p. 179) is interested in the following question:  What 
causes (normal) recessions?  He comes up with the following indicators: Inventories, homes, cars, 
and equipments.  Furthermore, he notes that industries that suffered most by employment losses 
during recession were:  Manufacturing and construction.  
                                                           
1 Special thanks go to Helgi Tomáson, the CBI and the University of Iceland who made this data set available. 3 
 
 
Overall, Leamer has provided us with new insights into the US business cycle and in the following 




2.  Dating the business cycle in Iceland 
We use the quarterly real GDP series, in logs and with seasonal (S=4) differences, and we apply a 
Hewitt-Prescott (HP) filter with a small smoothing parameter to remove the high frequency noise. 
The results can be seen in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1   a) Iceland, quarterly real GDP and consumption; 
b) HP filters of quarterly real GDP and consumption 
      
The spectrum of real GDP is estimated with a Bartlett window, and is shown in Figure 2.2. It reveals is 
a cyclic component of about 12 quarters, together with a strong first harmonic component of 6 quar-
ters, which indicates a non-symmetric form of the business cycle. 
Figure 2.2 a) Iceland, quarterly real GDP series, spectral density (with Bartlett window);  
     b) Quarterly export series, spectral density (with Bartlett window). 
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While the consumption pattern does not follow the business cycle, the exports do so with a similar 
spectrum as we see from Figure 2.4a. Also the imports follow the business cycle of about 12 quar-
ters, but without harmonic cycles, as we can see from Figure 2.4b. 
 
Imports and Exports (time domain) 
Figure 2.3 Iceland, a) quarterly import and b) export series, smoothed with the HP filter. 
a)  Imports           b) Exports 
   
 
Figure 2.4. Iceland, spectral density (estimated with Bartlett window) for 
a)  Imports (quarterly)         b) Exports (quarterly) 
 
Both, the spectrum of import and exports show a strong business cycles component. While for the 
exports the dominating cycle is the business cycle frequency, this is not the case for the imports, 
where a longer term trend/cycle dominates.  This might reflect a secular catching up trend of world 
trade goods in Iceland, since the country has no diversified consumer goods industry, but the exports 
of Iceland reflect also the high specialization in basically two industries: Fisheries (marine exports) 
and the aluminum industry. (Bauxit has to be imported, but a high value added can be achieved be-
cause of the cheap hydroelectric energy that is available in Iceland. These economic strategies were 
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Since Iceland has no official dating of the business cycle based on quarterly data, I decided to apply 
the HP filtering technique to the GDP growth rates and to come up with an own dating of the quar-
terly business cycle.  The HP method (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) is been used widely in applied ma-
cro-economics to smooth irregular time series. We will employ a HP-8 and a HP-64 filer where the 8 
and 64 stands for the smoothing constant of the penalty term. A high penalty term smoothes more 
and will give less turning points (see Figure 2.5a), while a small smoothing values will give more peaks 
and troughs. 
The results of the BC dating are summarized in the next Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Quarterly Icelandic business cycle dating 1970-2009 based on HP-8 filtering 
 
The first column displays the dating of the troughs, the second for the peaks. The quarterly dates 
that are printed in fat denote the main cycle with the dominating troughs and peaks, while the non-
fat numbers show the minor peaks. The last two columns show the length of the business cycles in 
terms of trough-to-trough and peak-to-peak lengths of the business cycle. The last row of the table 
shows a summary of the contraction and expansion lengths of the business cycle.  
We see that the average contraction length (peak to through, in the last row) is 6.3 quarters while 
the average expansion length is 6.7 quarter, together they give a sum of just 13 quarters. The stan-
dard deviation of the expansion phases is about double the size of the contraction phase, which 
agrees well with findings of other country’s business cycle, where expansion phases are also lasting 
usually longer. Furthermore, this finding agrees well with the average lengths of peak-to-peak and 
through-to-through phases, both being about 13 quarters long. Note that the standard deviation of 
the peak-to-peak phases is about 1 quarter longer than the through-to-through phases. 
BUSINESS CYCLE  
REFERENCE DATES 
DURATION IN QUARTERS 
Peak  Trough  Contraction  Expansion  Cycle 
Quarters 












Peak from  
previous 
Peak 
1971:4            1973:1 (spurt)  5  -  -  - 
1973:3            1975:3  (sputter)  8  2  10  7 
 1977:3            1980:1 
 (1980:2)         (1980:4)  (flat) 
10  8  18  16 
 1981:4            1983:2  6  7  13  17 
  1985:1            1985:4 (sputter)  3  7  10  13 
 1987:1           1988:4  7  5  12  8 
 1990:3            1992:2  7  7  14  14 
 1994:1           1995:2 (spurt)  5  7  12  14 
 1998:3           1999:4    5  13  18  18 
 2000:4            2002:3  7  4  11  9 
2005:2            2006:4  (spurt)        6  11  17  18 
2007:3  >8  3  >11  9 

















Summary: The smoothing with the HP
the smoothing with the HP-8 filter yields 
 
 
Figure 2.5a HP-64 filter: 6 peaks and 5 troughs
 
An aside: The prediction of the current 
In the last line of Table 2.1 we have made a
peak of 2007:3. If we look in the pre
a peak and a through lasted in Iceland f
the current contraction phase produces a
month we end up with 2011:2 as
In the next Table 2.2 we show the quarterly 
now removed from Table 2.1. This dating procedure now corresponds to a HP 
larger smoothing constant (lambda= 64 instead of 8)
From the pre-last lines of Table 2.2 (Average length (quarters)) we see that the length of the contra
tion and expansion phase have now increased to 16 quarter
business cycle is now lasting between 8 and 9 years.  Following this reasoning, we see that the peak
to-peak phases for the main business cycles are 2 quarters shorter than the trough
 
Table 2.2 Main Quarterly Icelandic Business Cycle dating 1970
BUSINESS CYCLE  
Summary: The smoothing with the HP-64 filter gives 6 peaks and 5 troughs (see Figure 
8 filter yields 13 peaks and 13 troughs (see Figure 2.1
64 filter: 6 peaks and 5 troughs 
 
current phase of the BC/TP in Iceland 
1 we have made a simple prediction of the next through point after the last 
2007:3. If we look in the pre-last column we see that until now the maximum p
d a through lasted in Iceland for about 18 month. Applying this estimate for the length of 
the current contraction phase produces a worst case scenario: After a long decline phase 
2011:2 as a most likely turning point for the next upturn. 
.2 we show the quarterly business cycle dating in Iceland but the 
1. This dating procedure now corresponds to a HP filtering
larger smoothing constant (lambda= 64 instead of 8) as can be seen from Figure 2.
last lines of Table 2.2 (Average length (quarters)) we see that the length of the contra
tion and expansion phase have now increased to 16 quarters (= 4 years), implying that the current 
business cycle is now lasting between 8 and 9 years.  Following this reasoning, we see that the peak
peak phases for the main business cycles are 2 quarters shorter than the trough
Main Quarterly Icelandic Business Cycle dating 1970-2009 based on HP
DURATION IN QUARTERS
(see Figure 2.5a) while  
2.1). 
 
simple prediction of the next through point after the last 
st column we see that until now the maximum period between 
estimate for the length of 
a long decline phase of 18 
 
dating in Iceland but the smaller peaks are 
filtering method with 
as can be seen from Figure 2.5. 
last lines of Table 2.2 (Average length (quarters)) we see that the length of the contrac-
s (= 4 years), implying that the current 
business cycle is now lasting between 8 and 9 years.  Following this reasoning, we see that the peak-
peak phases for the main business cycles are 2 quarters shorter than the trough-to-trough cycles. 







Figure 2.5b: GDP and HP-64 filter for the main business cycles phases in Iceland 
 
Finally we look at the profile of growth contributions over the Iceland business cycle.  The growth 
contributions GC(i) of component i out of n contributors  are defined generally in the following way: 
GC(i) =  increase (i)/ (level(1) + … + level(n) )  for  i =1,…,n, 
 
where the increase at time t is defined as increase(i) = level(i,t) - level(i,t-1). 
Growth contributions can be used to determine the relative importance of each component in the 












Peak  Trough  Contraction  Expansion  Cycle 
1971:4              -  -  -  - 
                 1975:3    13       
 1977:3                8    23 
                        1983:2  16    31   
 1987:1                19    38 
                       1992:2  21    36   
 1998:3               25    46 
                        2002:3  16    41   
2005:2              ?  11    27 
2007:3   (spurt)  ?-9  >20  >11  >38 
Prediction       2011:2?  15?    18max   
Average(quarters)  16,5  15,8  36,0  33,5 
St.Dev. (quarters)  3,3  7,7  5,0  10,5 8 
 
 
be used to create a growth profile as it can be seen in the next 
in expansion and contraction phases.
We see that imports are not contributing to growth, neither in 
The main ’driver’ of the BC in terms of growth contributions is the variable fixed capital formation. 
Exports and government consumption are the positive contributors during contraction phases, which 
prevent worse developments. 
 
Figure 2.6: Iceland: growth contributions during the 3 recent expansion and contraction phases
a)  Expansion     
 
3.  Business Cycles  and Explorative 
 
In this section we explore the potential of some macroeconomic indicators to predict 
(TPs).  For this purpose we look at the behavior of the indicator 4 quarters b
that we obtained from our HP-TP dating analysis in the 
of macro-economic indicators for 
in “TP synchronization plots” as in Leamer (2009)
dating of the upper or lower turning points and then we overlay the observations before a
the turning points. To make the comparison easier we can shift the 
away so to make them pass it through the same point at the 
pattern recognition from such synchronization plots makes the candidate series a potential BC ind
cator. In the next section we discuss a series of turning point 
possibility of a reliable leading indicator.
 
3.1 GDP growth synchronization around peaks
 
be used to create a growth profile as it can be seen in the next Figure 2.6 for comparing GDP growth 
expansion and contraction phases. 
We see that imports are not contributing to growth, neither in expansion nor in contraction phases. 
The main ’driver’ of the BC in terms of growth contributions is the variable fixed capital formation. 
Exports and government consumption are the positive contributors during contraction phases, which 
: Iceland: growth contributions during the 3 recent expansion and contraction phases
       b) contraction 
and Explorative Turning Point Analysis 
In this section we explore the potential of some macroeconomic indicators to predict 
at the behavior of the indicator 4 quarters before and after the TP 
TP dating analysis in the section 2. We are interested in the behavior 
economic indicators for turning points and therefore we study the behavior of the indicator 
in “TP synchronization plots” as in Leamer (2009). To apply this technique we need the quarterly 
upper or lower turning points and then we overlay the observations before a
the turning points. To make the comparison easier we can shift the indicator observation in such 
m pass it through the same point at the predefined turning point
pattern recognition from such synchronization plots makes the candidate series a potential BC ind
In the next section we discuss a series of turning point synchronization plots to explore the 
possibility of a reliable leading indicator. 
rowth synchronization around peaks and troughs 
Figure 2.6 for comparing GDP growth 
expansion nor in contraction phases. 
The main ’driver’ of the BC in terms of growth contributions is the variable fixed capital formation. 
Exports and government consumption are the positive contributors during contraction phases, which 
: Iceland: growth contributions during the 3 recent expansion and contraction phases 
 
In this section we explore the potential of some macroeconomic indicators to predict turning points 
efore and after the TP 
We are interested in the behavior 
and therefore we study the behavior of the indicator 
To apply this technique we need the quarterly 
upper or lower turning points and then we overlay the observations before and after 
indicator observation in such 
ing point. Successful 
pattern recognition from such synchronization plots makes the candidate series a potential BC indi-
plots to explore the 9 
 
 
We start with a “confirmation plot” to find out how the own GDP growth is behaving around the 
turning points. The confirmation plot shows if the dating of the turning points, which were done by 
the HP filters, also leads to the expected tent-type behavior of the growth rates of GDP before and 
after a turning point. Such confirmation plot were not necessary for the US, because NBER is doing 
the dating of the turning points, but can be used to confirm any other reasonable method for dating 
turning points as well.  
As we see from Figure 3.1 the movement of the growths rates of GDP around the turning point have 
the right curvature but the variance is quite high (about 10 percentage points). This shows that the 
business cycle activity around the turning points in Iceland is quite heterogeneous across cycles. 
Figure 3.1 Confirmation plot: GDP growth rates behavior around the a)  upper and  b) lower turning 
point of GDP 
   
The next diagrams are turning points analyses to make guesses for potential leading indicators. We 
gave these exploratory procedures and diagrams the title: “TP teller” or “TP explorer”. 
If we look at the macro-economic indicator (real) consumption growth, we see that consumption lags 
the GDP turning point by 1 quarter. 
 
Figure 3.3. GDP turning point exploration for consumption growth  
a)  upper   and        b) lower turning point of consumption 
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In the next Figure 3.4 we look at TAX revenues as a potential turning point indicator. Surprisingly we 
see no pattern. It should be interesting to find out if this TAX revenue behavior extends e.g. to direct 
and indirect taxes. 
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Figure 3.4. GDP turning point exploration for TAX revenue growth 
a)  upper     and        b) lower turning point of TAX revenues 
 
Figure 3.4. GDP turning point exploration for the unemployment rate (UR) 
a)  upper     and        b) lower turning point of UR 
   
From the trough explorer in Figure 3.4a we see that the unemployment rate rises up to 3 quarters 
after the lower turning point. Also for the peak TP we see that for about 2-3 quarters after the TP the 
series are quite stable. 
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 trough TP explorer UR4
quarter
sss
76  80  83 86 89  92 95  100 2  7




trough TP teller TAX4
quarter
sss
76 80 83 86 89 92 95 100 2 712 
 
 
Figure 3.5. GDP turning point exploration for real exchange rate differences REXD = REXX-REXM, 
where REXX and REXM are the real exchange rates for exports and imports respectively. 
a)  upper   and        b) lower turning point of exchange rate differences 
   
The next Figure 3.6 shows why the long (LS) and short term (RS) interest rate in Iceland (together 
with the RISK premium and the world short term interest rate) have no predictive power.  First of all, 
the interest rates were not recorded until 1988 and then they started at astronomical heights. Thus it 
makes no sense to use the spread as a leading indicator. 
 
Figure 3.6 Iceland interest rates and the world short term interest rate (WRS) 
 
 
3.2 Summary of the turning point exploration plots 
Generally, we found no convincing evidence for a leading indicator of the GDP turning point behavior 
in Iceland.  There are 2 possibilities for this finding: Either the turning point dating method by 
peaks/troughs of the HP filter is not a reliable procedure to locate the extremes of a growth rate 
series or the turning point prediction for a small economy is much more difficult.   
Nevertheless, there is some weak evidence for turning point leaders and laggers that we can sum-
marize in the following way: 



























































•  GDP peak leaders are: Exports (EX), pretax income (YJ), real exchange rate difference (REX-
RIM), and real exchange rate ratio (REXM/REX ). 
•  The only GDP lagger we found is exports of non-durable consumption. 
•  GDP trough leaders are: Unit labor costs (ULC), exports of maritime products (EXMAR), and 
consumer price index (CPI). 
•  No pattern: TAX revenues, money M3, long and short interest rate. 
Weak evidence means that the indicator peaks 1-2 quarters before the GDP turning point, but there 
is a large chance (up to 50:50) chance that the indicator is not correct. Again this type of behavior 
contrasts sharply with the findings in Leamer (2009), where the indicators have a much large chance 
of being correct (up to 90:10). It remains to be seen if such a  weak evidence for turning point indica-
tors can be also observed for other European economies and why the US turning point behavior over 
the last 50 years seem to be more regular than for other economies. 
 
4. Abnormal contributions to growth 
In this section we follow up the idea of using the time series of contributions to growth as predictors 
for turning points (TPs). This idea was proposed by Leamer (2009) in the following way: Since the 
series of growth contribution is not stable and exhibits up and downs that depend on the structure of 
the economy, we are only interested in the abnormal (excessive high or low) growth contributions.  
Thus, we need a non-linear smoother of the series of growth contribution, and we use as in Leamer 
(2009) a piecewise linear regression model. As knots (regime dividers) of the 3 regimes we 
use the lower TP 2003:3 and the upper turning point 2007:3.  To use the regression model to 
obtain the abnormal contributions to growth we first cumulate the series of growth contributions 
and fit the 3-regime spline model to the cumulated series. In this way we can obtain the abnormal 
growth contribution as the residuals of the linear spline fit. Thus, we define as abnormal growth con-
tribution the deviations from an average of growth rates between two turning points. 
First we analyze the contributions to growth as they are reported by the CBI but only for the period 
1998:1 to 200:9. These series are given only for the following variables:   
"GDP" … gross domestic product,   "CON" … consumption,  
"EX"… exports,        "IMP"… imports,  
"INVR"… inventories,      "GC"… government consumption,   
"GFCF"… gross fixed capital formation.  
During the period 1998:1 to 2000:9 we find one trough turning point at 2002:3 and 2 peak TPs: the 
first one at 1998:3 and the second at 2005:2. The first peak TP is too close to the start of the series of 
growth contributions, so we can only make a complete plot for the second one. 
In order to forecast the next lower turning point after the last peak of GDP growth, we pretend that 
2009:1 is a possible lower turning point and we observe the traces of abnormal growth indicators to 
predict this lower turning point. 14 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The abnormal cumulated growth of GDP (spline and residuals) 
 
The left panel of Figure 4.1 shows that during the first regime up to 2003, the contraction period of 
GDP, and the growth contributions were smaller than in the subsequent expansion period. Over the 
last quarters of the series (since 2008) the growth contributions of GDP are falling. The right panel 
shows the residuals of the spline fit and should exhibit a stationary behavior. 
 
Figure 4.2 The abnormal cumulated growth of consumption (spline and residuals) 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that the fitted spline of the cumulated growth contributions for consumption fol-
lows the same pattern as the one for GDP but for consumption the patterns are more cyclical. Espe-
cially the steep decline in the growth contributions of consumption in the current contraction phase 
implies that there is no hope for growth stimuli stemming from domestic consumption. The residuals 
show that there had been 2 more peaks of the growth contributions of consumption in the first 














































































Figure 4.3 The abnormal cumulated growth of government consumption (spline and residuals) 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that the growth contributions for government consumption follows a strong in-
creasing path, which only started to level off during the quarters in the last regime. It could well be 
that the growth contributions will turn negative if the government has no reserves to stimulate 
growth. 
 
Figure 4.4 The abnormal cumulated growth of exports (spline and residuals) 
 
Figure 4.4 displays the acyclic path of the growth contributions (GC) for exports: The growth contri-
butions have been higher during the contraction phases than in expansion phases, and have gained 
momentum in the last regime. During a booming economy domestic consumption seem to draw 
upon the goods that are otherwise exported in contraction phases. Thus, exports remain the only big 
abnormal growth contribution or extra stimulus during the current slump (contraction) of GDP. Note 
from the residuals that we see a heteroskedastic trend, which means that despite the positive overall 








































































Figure 4.5 The abnormal cumulated growth of imports (spline and residuals) 
 
 
From Figure 4.5 we see that the growth contributions (GC) for imports are almost a mirror image of 
the growth contributions of the exports. The recent increase might just offset the negative develop-
ment that could be observed during the last expansion of the business cycle. The large decline of the 
growth contributions in 2005-2006 might indicate the last phase of the excessive bubble economy 
resulting in heavy imports that led to lower turning point in 2008. 
 
Figure 4.6 The abnormal cumulated growth of Gross Fixed Capital formation (GFCF) 
 
 
From Figure 4.6 we see that GFCF had sent a large impulse during the last expansion phase to GDP 
growth. In the current contraction phase the positive trend of the previous expansion phase is com-
pletely offset. Judging from the steepness of the spline the current contraction phase has a larger 
negative impact on GDP growth than the contraction phase until 2003. During the “bubble years” 












































































Figure 4.7 The abnormal cumulated growth of Inventories (spline and residuals) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 shows that abnormal growth contributions of inventories have increased over the 3 re-
gimes and exhibit an atypical pattern. Comparing the growth contribution results of Iceland with the 
ones for the USA in Leamer (2009) we see that the growth contributions in the USA follow a much 
smoother development (and cover a much longer period, i.e. the last 50 years).  The Icelandic growth 
contributions seem to be much more dependent on the specific phases of the business cycle, espe-
cially in the last decade. This might be an indication that growth contributions for small economies 
are subject to much more volatile influences. Note that fitting spline regressions results usually in a 
R-square of above 0.9 and only a few coefficients are not significant. In Iceland the growth contribu-
tion over the first declining phase has been essentially zero. The current positive trend might reflect 
the inventory built up after the bubble years. 
As a next step we look at the predictive power of the abnormal growth contribution for the turning 
points of the business cycle. We start in Figure 4.8 with the first lower turning point in 2002:1. 
 






























































Figure 4.8 shows that most of the abnormal growth contributions (except exports) decline during the 
time before the lower turning point 2001:1. The sharpest decline before the turning points - and 
therefore have the role of a leading indicator - can be found for GDP and Imports, followed by Con-
sumption and GFCF. Exports seem to have anticline predictive power since it peaks just at the trough 
turning points. Surprisingly, Inventories show a flat behavior. 
Figure 4.9 displays the behavior of the growth contributions at the peak turning point of 2005:2. Un-
fortunately, we cannot see any strong pattern for a leading indicator. Most indicators peak after the 
peak. GDP, Consumption and GFCF are upward moving while Imports follow a negative trend.  The 
analysis of a second peak, if data were available, might bring more light on this issue. 
 
Figure 4.9 The behavior of abnormal growth contributions at the peak turning point of 2005:2 
 
In Figure 4.10 we follow up the question if 2009:1 could have been a lower turning point if we ana-
lyse the behavior of the abnormal growth contribution in the 4 quarters before this point. As we see, 
there is no clear picture, the only decrease we see for Imports, followed by GDP and Gross Fixed 
Capital formation (GFCF). The other indicators move up. A more reliable indicator would be that 
































Figure 4.10 Prediction by indicators: Is there a possible trough turning point in 2009:1? 
 
4.  Business cycle accelerators 
Leamer (2009) proposes in analogy to the Samuelson multiplier-accelerator model an exploratory 
search diagram that shows if certain abnormal growth of variables accelerate the phases of the busi-
ness cycle. For this purpose we correlate the abnormal growth contributions of GDP with those of 
the available indicators: Has such acceleration happened in Iceland and if so for what variables?  If 
abnormal growth contributions are positively correlated, then expansion phases of the business cycle 
are accelerated, if abnormal growth contributions are negatively correlated, then contraction phases 
of the business cycle are accelerated, i.e. growth shrinks more rapidly. (Otherwise abnormal growth 
contributions are neutral.) 
From the abnormal growth contributions of the Icelandic business cycle we found the following two 
positive accelerators: Consumption and Gross Fixed Capital formation (GFCF), while Inventories are 
negative accelerators. 
 
Figure 5.1  Abnormal growth contributions of Consumption is a positive growth accelerator for GDP 
 











































accCON gegen accCON_1 (mit Kleinst-Quadrate-Anpassung)
Y = 0,0815 + 0,512X20 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Inventories are negative accelerators and GFCF is a positive accelerator 
 
   
 
6.  Summary  
This paper has dated the Icelandic business cycle by a simple HP filtering method of the GDP growth 
rates. Depending on the smoothness constant we find a long or a short business cycle (see Table2). 
We find that the business cycle in Iceland between 1970 and 2009 is on average rather short: 12 
quarters. Most macro-economic variables are pro-cyclical and there is little evidence for leading indi-
cators. The financial variables are not reliable indicators for the BC since most financial indicators are 
useful after 1990.  
The current downturn of the Iceland economy is one of the sharpest in history and it might a long 
time for recovery. The analysis of the main macro-economic variables in Iceland has shown that the 
business cycle in Iceland follows a familiar cyclical pattern but the internal dynamic laws of the busi-
ness cycle cannot be fully understood with the current tools of macro-economic analysis as e.g ., the 
exploratory tools in Leamer (2009). One reason might be that the data base in Iceland is short, be-
cause the economic growth in Iceland has started quite lately. Having reached a high level of income 
in a relative short time, the challenge now is to maintain a high standard of economic activity and to 
lay out a sustainable growth path.  
Unfortunately, many early warnings and advices for cautious development (see Krugman (1991) or 
Stiglitz (2001), and the main points are summarized in the appendix) were not put into practice and 
resulted in a bubble economy. The task for economic policy is now twofold: Firstly, to heal the 
wounds of the financial crisis 2008 and to lay out a growth path for the Iceland economy. Secondly, 
to restore the confidence of the domestic consumers and of foreign investors, like the implementa-
tion of a reliable institutional framework for future financial developments. 
At this point a caution with respect to the data base has to be made and creates a potential challeng-
ing task for the future: Despite the fact that the macro-economic data base for the last 2 decades is 
quite good, some important macro variables that might be important indicators for the business 
cycle of the Iceland economy are not recorded. These missing data recordings should be implement-
ted quite quickly, together with more detailed research as what additional variables are needed and 
important to understand the latent mechanism of the Iceland economy. Iceland is a good example 
how economic prosperity is tied to the financial system in a globalised world. Early warning system 
should be developed to prevent uncontrolled financial developments since they backfire to the real 





















accINVR gegen accINVR_1 (mit Kleinst-Quadrate-Anpassung)






















accGFCF gegen accGFCF_1 (mit Kleinst-Quadrate-Anpassung)
Y = -0,00861 + 0,439X21 
 
 
Further research problems are: This paper could not find reliable indicators for the business cycle in 
Iceland. One reason could be the macroeconomic data base: Iceland has started to build up a reliable 
quarterly data base over the last 20 years, but some important indicators are still missing. Like e.g. 
housing starts, consumer debts, mobile goods, foreign currency accounts, and short and long term 
interest rates. This is an argument for the refinement of the macro-economic measurement process. 
Another reason could be the size effect: it seems that small economies like Iceland have a more irre-
gular synchronization patterns around turning points than in larger economies (US). In support of this 
argument we point out that the abnormal growth contributions across the phases of the BC in Icel-
and seem to vary much more than in the US. Both features might be related to an economic size 
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Appendix: Business Cycle Chronology in the USA 
The NBER's Recession Dating Procedure
2 
The National Bureau's Business Cycle Dating Committee maintains a chronology of the U.S. business 
cycle. The chronology identifies the dates of peaks and troughs that frame economic recession or 
expansion. The period from a peak to a trough is a recession and the period from a trough to a peak 
is an expansion. According to the chronology, the most recent peak occurred in March 2001, ending a 
record-long expansion that began in 1991. The most recent trough occurred in November 2001, in-
augurating an expansion. 
A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than 
a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and 
wholesale-retail sales. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends 
as the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion. Ex-
pansion is the normal state of the economy; most recessions are brief and they have been rare in 
recent decades. 
In choosing the dates of business-cycle turning points, we follow standard procedures to assure con-
tinuity in the chronology. Because a recession influences the economy broadly and is not confined to 
one sector, we emphasize economy-wide measures of economic activity. We view real GDP as the 
single best measure of aggregate economic activity. In determining whether a recession has occurred 
and in identifying the approximate dates of the peak and the trough, we therefore place considerable 
weight on the estimates of real GDP issued by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. The traditional role of the committee is to maintain a monthly chronology, 
however, and the BEA's real GDP estimates are only available quarterly. For this reason, we refer to a 
variety of monthly indicators to determine the months of peaks and troughs. 
The committee places particular emphasis on two monthly measures of activity across the entire 
economy: (1) personal income less transfer payments, in real terms and (2) employment. In addition, 
we refer to two indicators with coverage primarily of manufacturing and goods: (3) industrial produc-
tion and (4) the volume of sales of the manufacturing and wholesale-retail sectors adjusted for price 
changes. We also look at monthly estimates of real GDP such as those prepared by Macroeconomic 
Advisers (see http://www.macroadvisers.com). Although these indicators are the most important 
measures considered by the NBER in developing its business cycle chronology, there is no fixed rule 
about which other measures contribute information to the process. 
The committee's approach to determining the dates of turning points is retrospective. We wait until 
sufficient data are available to avoid the need for major revisions. In particular, in determining the 
date of a peak in activity, and thus the onset of recession, we wait until we are confident that, even 
in the event that activity begins to rise again immediately, it has declined enough to meet the crite-
rion of depth. As a result, we tend to wait to identify a peak until many months after it actually oc-
curs. 
 
                                                           
2 Business Cycle Dating Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research, January 7, 2008 23 
 
 
BUSINESS CYCLE  
REFERENCE DATES 
DURATION IN MONTHS 
Peak  Trough  Contraction  Expansion  Cycle 
Quarterly dates 



































































Dec 1854 (IV) 
Dec 1858 (IV) 
June 1861 (III) 
Dec 1867 (I) 
Dec 1870 (IV) 
March 1879 (I) 
 
May 1885 (II) 
April 1888 (I) 
May 1891 (II) 
June 1894 (II) 












March 1919 (I) 
July 1921 (III) 
July 1924 (III) 
November 1927 
(IV) 
March 1933 (I) 
 





May 1954 (II) 






March 1975 (I) 








































































































































































Average, all cycles: 
1854-2001 (32 cycles) 
1854-1919 (16 cycles) 
1919-1945 (6 cycles) 


















  49** 
53 
67 
* 31 cycles 
** 15 cycles 
Source: NBER 
Appendix B: Stiglitz (2001) on Iceland (selected in bold) 
p.18: “While the growth benefits of capital market liberalization are dubious at best, there is 
clear evidence concerning the adverse effect on the risk facing a country.  
Moreover, the contention that short-term flows are stabilizing is simply empirically incorrect, and 
was known to have been incorrect before the crisis:  short-term capital flows are pro-cyclical, not 
countercyclical, and thus almost inevitably exacerbate, not dampen, fluctuations.20 
 The instability of these flows contributes to overall economic instability; capital market liberaliza-
tion is systematically related to more frequent and deeper crises.  Moreover, the evidence is that 
these crises have long-lasting effects, with growth slower for five years or more after the onset. “ 
“Capital market restrictions, or as I prefer to refer to them, interventions, can take a variety of 
forms:  disclosure requirements, tax laws, banking and financial sector regulations, direct controls.  
These interventions can be combined.  As in other arenas, there is some argument for market- or 
price-based mechanisms, such as Chile’s effective tax on capital inflows.  Malaysia converted its 
controls on outflows into taxes.  Iceland does not face the problem that many developing countries 
have regarding high levels of corruption associated with different forms of exchange rate controls.  
Nonetheless, as discussed below, there is some preference for price-based mechanisms in the cur-
rent environment.” 
p.20: “Such interventions can be WTO-consistent, by simply imposing excise taxes on commodi-
ties in which imports have a relatively high share; this is especially easy for a small country, like 
Iceland.  Since the country does not produce automobiles, for example, an excise tax on automo-
biles is de facto (though not de jure) a tax on imported goods.” 
On Financial Systems  
p.20: ”Major collapses, with longer-lasting effects, are especially associated with the vulnerability 
of the banking system, which is one of the reasons that it is important for the government to play 
a role in prudential regulation.  While the recent emphasis on risk management systems is wel-
come, a broader “portfolio” approach to regulation is required, especially given the high levels of 
volatility associated with asset prices in small open economies.  A bank that might have looked as 
if it were acting prudently, with high levels of collateral requirements, will find that the value of the 
collateral collapses in the event of a crisis. “ 
p.27:  “Furthermore, rigid enforcement of capital adequacy requirements can be self-defeating, not 
only failing to improve the balance sheet of the banks, but also contributing significantly to an eco-
nomic downturn. Indeed, it has been shown that excess reliance on capital adequacy standards is 
Pareto inefficient.  
Other regulations are an important part of the regulatory “portfolio” with emphasis on different 
parts changing as circumstances change.  For instance, speed limits (limiting the pace of expansion of 
banks) and limits on the exposure to different risks can play an important role. 
Speed limits are restrictions on the rate at which banks can increase their lending.  Experience in 
the United States (in the savings and loan debacle) and elsewhere show that banks which increase 25 
 
 
their lending most rapidly are most prone to crisis.  This may be partly because banks cannot man-
age expansion beyond some rate; their ability to hire additional personnel to do the requisite 
screening and monitoring is limited.   
It may also be because banks with low or negative net worth are more willing to undertake the 
risks of rapid growth.  It may be because those willing to expand most rapidly are those most op-
timistic about the future, and they genuinely believe that the loans are good loans; but with depo-
sit insurance (whether implicit or explicit) it is taxpayers who pay for their excessive exuberance, 
and they are not subjected to the kind of market discipline that they might be without that deposit 




“The design of the financial system should take into account the risks associated with systemic 
failure.  The fact that real estate prices are highly volatile means that real estate lending is espe-
cially risky.  Separating out such lending from other lending may thus reduce the “contagion” effect 
of a collapse in real estate prices, and the benefit of doing so may exceed the cost in terms of risk 
reduction from diversification (the effect which has been most often emphasized in the argument 
for the creation of broad-based financial institutions.)” 
p.28: “Many of the most recent crises have been related to the collapse of real estate bubbles.  
Governments can, and should, also try to dampen investments in real estate when there appears 
to be a real estate bubble, and these investments are a major contributing factor to the trade defi-
cit (through exchange rate effects).  Though it may in many circumstances be difficult to ascertain 
with certainty whether there is such a bubble, there are a number of indicators, and policy can 
adjust, e.g., to increase taxes or collateral requirements, as the evidence mounts. This is a policy I 
would have recommended, for instance, for Thailand.  In a sense, one might argue that it tried to 
do this, through the traditional instrument of increasing the interest rate.  But what matters is not 
the interest rate paid on government bonds (the instrument that monetary authorities typically 
focus upon), but the interest rate borrowers pay and the amount of credit that is available.  An 
increase in the former interest rate may not translate one-for-one into an increase in the latter, 
and may not result in a significant reduction in credit availability. “ 
Plus on: 5.  POLICY ISSUES FACING ICELAND  
“The overall policy framework of the previous section can be used to frame some of the key policy 
issues facing Iceland today, as set out in Section 3.  The large current account deficit may or may 
not be a real problem, but it represents a risk, and it would therefore be prudent to take actions to 
reduce it.  The current account deficit has been associated with a credit boom financed by foreign 
borrowing. The conjunction of an economic upswing that began in 1996 and the very recent libera-
lization of financial markets laid the foundations for the foreign financed credit boom.  It was in 
turn fuelled by the policy of exchange rate stability and explicit and implicit government guarantees 
of the banking system. The increased degree of competition for market shares among financial 
institutions that accompanied the start of the privatization process in 1998 gave the credit boom a 
further boost. All these issues have to be addressed in order to reduce the risks that the Icelandic 
economy is facing. “ 
 